The Proliferation of Discontent

Between technology and ambition, the world is ever-changing and continually evolving, or devolving, as one might observe.

This past week, two nations -- Iran and North Korea -- both indicated their intent to produce nuclear material. The former claimed a plant it is building in Arak, located in the center of Iran, is a heavy-water nuclear fuel plant. The latter boasted its intent to produce nuclear weapons.

The US confirmed Iran's plant project with a number of drone aircraft sent to monitor Iran's activities, and instruments designed to measure radioactive material confirmed North Korea's ability to begin production on short- and medium-range weaponry.

Hence the technology angle.

Whether it's Alexander the Great, Hitler or Saddam Hussein, the egomaniacal urge to conquer and control other people and resources has only grown stronger, despite this planet's evolving civilization. Except the notions of evolution and civilization are, on occasion, diametric opposites. Evolution, ie survival of the "fittest," doesn't always fit into debate, diplomacy and compromise; it rarely occurs in a calm, civilized fashion, and based on the threats indicated at the outset above, we could be in for a very bumpy ride.

Nuclear materials have been relatively available on the black market: the movie "The Peacemaker," starring George Clooney, was a simplistic view of the problem of proliferation, but touched on a problem that will only increase as time drags on. Nuclear material doesn't evaporate and can't be easily discarded, and thus requires nations to be careful to catalog and protect its supplies thereof. The disintegration of the Soviet Union into small nation-states begs the question: where are all the nuclear missiles the Soviets were stockpiling in answer to Ronald Reagan's ramping up in the 1980's? It's a fairly safe bet Russia can't answer that question as accurately as they, or the world at large, might like. Missiles silo'd in the middle of a dank expanse of former Soviet land, housed in insecure hangars and silos, are not only vulnerable, but can be easily removed and reapplied for another assignment, whether that assignment is in Europe, the Middle East, or the US.

The very nature of nuclear material is, due to its highly identifiable chemical nature, it can be dated (ie radio carbon-dating) so it's got a finger-print, even if after fission has taken place, so material can be tracked and located. The problem is that the majority of post Soviet Union nuclear material wasn't catalogged accurately and, much like a huge department store, if items aren't realized to be missing, then it's largely impossible to know how much is missing in the first place.

What this means to us today is the possibility of a "dirty bomb" -- using a small amount of enriched uranium, a conventional bomb can be converted to a dirty bomb, which spreads nuclear material over a limited range. In essence, while a so-called "dirty bomb" won't carry the destructive payload of a typical nuclear missile, it will effectively destroy a limited area. In other words, it doesn't do as much damage, but the damage will be done by effectively making its target area unusable until it is "cleaned," which is not a simple process and which will not allay people's fears in this, or any other, target nation.

The question, then, remains as to how nuclear proliferation became such an immediate, and disturbing, problem. That's a problem for another day and another space; but simply put, as it seemingly has always been, the masters let slip the dogs of war and very soon thereafter lose control over their own creations. It's not a question of technology advancing; that much is a given. What is abundantly clear is that unless the manufacturing and production of weapons as a result of the availability of materials is halted, the world will be changing very rapidly, and, quite assuredly, in a notable, significant way.

North Korea's and Iran's stability today aren't so much a concern; despite Kim Jong-il's tempestuous personality claiming an imminent US attack on North Korea, the majority of what is coming from the North is rhetoric and smokescreen. Iran, to be sure, is less worrisom in its rule by committee. However, Iran is a relatively unstable nation, given its history, and worse, Tehran expects a US attack, especially given that George W. Bush has not denied military action as a possible method to preventing Iran's successful production of a nuclear plant that is surely not about producing nuclear energy for the Iranian people.

Interestingly, both of these nations have pointed to George Bush's interest in attacking them as a means for producing and maintaining an arsenal. North Korea, in fact, has demanded a bilateral conference with the US as a precursor to its slowing or stopping production of nuclear weapons, which the US has, to this point, refused. Diplomacy may or may not solve one or both of these problems, but considering the Bush Administration's recent history vis-a-vis Iraq, one doesn't have to have a genius-level IQ to realize that a military "statement" might very well be the chosen methodology in one or both of these cases. In the case of North Korea, destruction of their nuclear facilities would be relatively feasible and would be quietly welcomed by the Chinese, the Indians, the Pakistanis and a majority of the nations in Southeast Asia. Iran's borders, however, are Muslim and any meddling in their affairs would carry the price of further recruitment of suicide bombers, plotters and anti-US sentiment in a region which is as highly volatile as a powder keg floating in a vat of gasoline.

The problems we face as a world revolve around the errors of the past and we are in a virtual landmine. Fortunately, the same reticence and common sense that halted the Cuban Missile Crisis -- ie, power as its own deterrent -- will serve to rule the future of the world.

Or will it?